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Abstract:  In this article the new trend in authorisation decision making will be described, 
using the Security Assertions Mark up Language (SAML). We then present an 
overview of the Globus Toolkit (GT), used in Grid computing environments, 
and highlight its authorisation requirements. We then introduce the PERMIS 
authorisation infrastructure and describe how it has been adapted to support 
SAML so that it can be deployed to make authorisation decisions for 
GTversion 3.3.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) [1] has been designed 
by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
(OASIS) to provide a universal mechanism for conveying security-related 
information between the various parts of an access control system. It is an 
XML-based language for encoding security request and response messages 
between the initiator of an access request, the authentication service, the 
authoriser (termed an attribute authority) and the access control decision 
function (ADF). Some of these parts of an access control system may be 
grouped together, in which case they will not need to send SAML messages 
between themselves, and may use some sort of API to convey the necessary 
information between each other.  
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The Globus Toolkit (GT) is an implementation of Grid software, which 
has a number of tools that make development and deployment of Grid 
Services easier [2]. One of the key features of this toolkit is secure 
communications. However, Globus Toolkit has limited authorisation 
capabilities based on simple access control lists. To improve its authorization 
capabilities a SAML authorisation callout has been added. The important 
consequence of this is that it will be possible to deploy an authorisation 
service that the GT will contact to make authorisation decisions about what 
methods can be executed by a given client. One such authorisation service is 
PERMIS [3]. Whilst the original PERMIS Java API was intended for local 
calls only, and didn’t have any network interface, a PERMIS Authorisation 
Service has been developed to provide authorisation decisions for the Globus 
Toolkit through the SAML callout. 
2. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGY 
2.1 SAML 
SAML is a language for expressing security-related information. It defines 
message formats in XML for Queries and Responses. It also defines a 
request-response protocol in SOAP over Http for carrying the SAML 
messages. SAML Queries are sent to a decision-making service whilst 
Responses, in the form of SAML Assertions, are returned. These assertions 
can then be coupled with a further Query and sent to other decision making 
services to aid them in their own decisions. In the SAML model there are 
three decision-making services: the Authentication decision-making service, 
the Attribute decision-making service and the Authorisation decision-making 
service (see Figure 1). Each decision-making service uses its associated 
policy and the user’s credentials to evaluate the Query. After the SAML 
Query has been evaluated, a SAML Response is generated and this may be 
forwarded to another decision-making service, until it finally reaches the 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) of the application, which will determine the 
ultimate fate of the user’s application request. The PEP is equivalent to the 
Access control Enforcement Function (AEF) in ISO 10181-3 Authorisation 
Framework [4]. 
SAML does not mandate any exact sequence of message flows for access 
control decision making. However, a typical flow might be as follows. A 
user’s access request is presented to a PEP/AEF, and comprises the user’s 
name, the user’s credentials, the target to be accessed and the requested 
mode of access. The PEP could then sequentially present portions of this 
request to the three decision-making services. Firstly the user’s name and 




credentials are presented to the Authentication Authority, which confirms 
the identity of the user. Next the authenticated name of the user (or the 
authentication assertion returned by the Authentication Authority) is 
presented to the Attribute Authority, which confirms the assignment of 
certain attributes to the user. Finally the attribute assertions, the name of the 
target and the requested mode of access are presented to the PDP, which 
makes an access control decision. The PEP then acts on this decision and 
either forwards the user’s request to the target (if the PDP granted the 






























Figure 1. SAML 
The SAML messages can be digitally signed, which makes them 
tamperproof, i.e. the messages can be sent as plaintext across untrusted 
networks. Alternatively, the SAML protocol messages could be sent as 
SOAP over Http over SSL, which can also protect them from eavesdropping. 
Until quite recently most uses of SAML were limited to authentication 
and attribute usage e.g. as in Shibboleth [5]. Authorisation decisions were 
usually made locally either based on the user’s identity (in Access Control 
Lists) or on the attributes/roles of the user (in simple scripts). 
Comment [VW1]: Shibboleth is a SAML 
attribute authority. I think we want to delete this 
paragraph. 
4 Authors David Chadwick1, Sassa Otenko1, Von Welch2
 
As virtual communities and Grid computing started to develop, identity-
based systems for authorization became increasingly difficult to manage due 
to the distributed nature of the user communities. To accommodate these 
communities, new authorisation systems were required that would make the 
decisions based on the attributes of the initiator rather than their identity. 
Another prerequisite for SAML authorisation messaging was that there 
should be a centralised decision-making point for a number of remote 
services, governed by the same policy. Thus Community Authorisation 
Server (CAS) [6], Akenti [7], PERMIS and others started to appear.  
2.2 The Globus toolkit 
The Globus Toolkit (GT) is a set of tools for building Grids that includes 
tools for resource discovery, job submission and data movement. Version 3 
of the Globus Toolkit (GT3), includes support for Grid Services based on the 
Open Grid Service Infrastructure (OGSI) standard, which defines extensions 
to Web Services for lifetime management and stateful instances (among 
other things outside the scope of this paper). GT3 provides a Grid Service 
Container to host Grid Services instances, which provides services such as 
message marshalling/de-marshalling, authentication and authorization. 
A virtual organization (VO) is a collection of users and resources, 
distributed across a number of geographic and administrative domains, 
which share common policies for access control. Initially access control was 
solved in GT through the use of simple access control lists called grid-map 
files, which performed mapping of access rights based on the user’s identity. 
Such simplistic policies were robust, but failed to scale as the VOs grew in 
size and spanned larger numbers of institutions. To provide more flexible 
authorisation solutions, it was decided to provide a SAML authorisation 
callout in GT3 to allow the use of advanced authorization services. The 
effect of this is that the Grid Service Container would be able to contact the 
centralised Policy Decision Point to make access control decisions for 
invocations of services it hosts. In this design the PDP becomes yet another 
Grid Service, which provides authorization decisions through a standard 
message format i.e. SAML. 
Now it is possible to create a CAS, Akenti, or PERMIS port that would 
make access control decisions for Grid Services, based on queries and 
decisions in the form of SAML Queries and Responses which are enforced 
by the Grid Service Container. A detailed description of the operation 
scenario is given later, with the example related to PERMIS. 
 





PERMIS is a policy based authorisation infrastructure, in which a user is granted 
rights to access a resource based on the authorisation policy for the resource, and 
the set of attributes (or roles) that the user possesses. A user’s attributes are 
stored in digitally signed X.509 attribute certificates [10], and are allocated by 
the authorities in charge of the various attributes. Thus a “doctor” role attribute 
could be allocated by the General Medical Council, whilst a “project manager” 
role attribute could be allocated by the head of a department. A “date of birth” 
attribute could be allocated by a national registrar. These attribute certificates 
are then stored in various LDAP directories.  
PERMIS  was designed with a Java API between the PDP and PEP providing 
the access control decisions. Given the name of the user, it retrieves the user’s 
attributes/roles and makes decisions based on them. The authorisation policy, 
written in XML, expresses which users can be assigned what attributes/roles by 
whom, and what privileges are bound to each of the attributes/roles. The XML 
policy is then inserted in an X.509 attribute certificate, signed by the manager 
who wrote it, and stored in an entry in an LDAP server.  
When an application starts up, its PEP/AEF passes to the PERMIS ADF/PDP 
the name of the manager, the location of the LDAP directory, and the unique 
number of the policy to be used (each policy is assigned a globally unique 
number – actually an object identifier [12] – so that a manager can create 
different policies to be used in different contexts). The PERMIS ADF retrieves 
the policy X.509 AC from the LDAP directory, checks the signature and policy 
number, and if both are correct, uses this policy for its decision making. 
3. THE IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1 Extensions to SAML 
A standard SAML Response contains a complete list of all the allowed 
actions which were contained in the SAML Query. While this is useful in 
cases where the response is passed to a third party, in the case where the 
query was generated by the consumer of the response it can introduce 
unnecessary overhead. In these cases the consumer of the response must 
parse the entire list of actions, when it may only be interested in a "yes" or 
"no" answer regarding the entire list as a whole. 
For the sake of performance, new SAML Requests and Responses have 
been proposed – they are shorter and more concise versions of the standard 
SAML Authorization Decision Request and Authorization Decision 
Statement (passed inside a SAML Query and SAML Response respectively). 
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These new messages allow the query to request, and the decision to contain, 
a simple yes/no response to all the actions contained in the query. This 
allows the authorization service to easily encode, and the Grid Service 
Container to easy parse, the response. The specification of these new SAML 
messages has been written by the Global Grid Forum’s (GGF) Open Grid 
Service Architecture  Authorisation working group (OGSA-AuthZ) [9]. 
 
3.2 Extensions to PERMIS 
As the demand for an authorisation service appeared in the Globus 
Toolkit, the PERMIS researchers closely collaborated with the GT team to 
provide practical input into the design of the SAML messages to be used in 
GT3. In parallel a standalone PERMIS ADF was developed. Whilst the 
original PERMIS RBAC ADF had to be contacted via its Java API, the 
standalone ADF has a networking interface, through which it can receive 
SAML Queries and send back SAML Responses. In addition to this, the 
PERMIS ADF can pose as a Grid Service, so it can be used as a centralised 
PDP of a Grid application. It can also easily be embedded as a Service 
Authorisation – i.e. a PERMIS Authorisation “Callout” can replace the GT3 
standard SAML Authorization Callout, and make local decisions for local 
Grid Services. 
The original PERMIS architecture supported only LDAP Distinguished 
Names as Target identifiers. This allowed PERMIS to group targets into 
domains for easier expression of the policy. It was noticed during the early 
development stages of PERMIS that in fact people use various kinds of 
naming conventions for identifying targets, e.g. IP addresses, DNS names, 
URIs etc., so the design of the PERMIS API incorporated Principals, as an 
abstraction for such identifiers. However, the original PERMIS pilot sites 
did not have any specific requirements about which type of naming to use, 
and so for consistency purposes target naming was chosen to be the same as 
subject naming. Since subjects were named using X.500/LDAP 
distinguished names, then so too were targets.  
When porting the code to work with the Globus Toolkit, it became 
necessary to allow other kinds of naming conventions to be used for targets, 
specifically because in Globus the intended targets are Grid Services, and 
they already have non-LDAP identifiers in the form of Grid Service Handles 
(GSHs), encoded in the form of a URI. URIs are hierarchical names like 
LDAP DNs, and this helps to group targets into domains (although of course 
in any particular Grid application the relevant targets at different sites may 
have totally unrelated URIs). URIs do not provide any further refinements 
for targets, unlike LDAP, which provides Object Classes to help to further 




distinguish between the different kinds of target e.g. printers or cpu clusters. 
This is one example of identifying targets by their attributes as well as or 
instead of their names. 
Besides changing the ADF interface to support URI target names, the 
PERMIS policy syntax also had to be extended to support URIs as Target 
Identifiers1. This allows the manager to specify target names as URIs. 
The PERMIS ADF assumes the subjects are authenticated, but it can 
recognise unauthenticated subjects, and now it will return public access 
rights to such subject names, i.e. it will grant access to the targets that do not 
require any roles to perform certain actions. 
The Java code for constructing subject and target domains is the same, so 
in principle subjects could also be identified by their URIs. This would 
allow, for example, particular Grid Services (which are the targets for 
normal Grid users) to act as subjects and to make requests to other services 
protected by the PERMIS infrastructure. For example, a Grid service could 
make a request to an attribute repository protected by the PERMIS ADF, and 
PERMIS could decide if the particular Grid Service is allowed to retrieve 
certain user Attribute Certificates (specified as targets), thus enforcing a 
user’s Privacy Policy.  
The question of how to locate the credentials of a subject identified by a 
URL in a repository that uses LDAP naming can in fact be solved in at least 
two ways. The first and easiest way is to use URLs that conform to RFC 
2255 [11]. This specifies how LDAP URLs can be used to retrieve 
information from LDAP repositories. An alternative way is to embed the 
URL as the latter part of the LDAP Distinguished Name and to configure the 
LDAP repository with the prefix DN.  
For file-based repositories, e.g. Web-servers or file-servers, it is possible 
to construct filenames out of the subject’s identifier, e.g. an MD5 hash of the 
normalised subject identifier (either the LDAP DN or URL) can be used to 
locate the files containing the necessary credentials2. 
The extended SAML Requests designed by the OGSA-Authz group and 
specified in [9] may contain Attribute Reference elements. In essence these 
are repository URLs from where the subject’s attributes should be retrieved 
by the Authorisation Service. This is a “semi-push” or “controlled pull” 
model, i.e. the subject doesn’t have to push all the credentials to the 
Authorisation Service as SAML evidence, or rely on the Authorisation 
Service to pull whichever attributes it wants from where, but instead can 
provide a reference to the repositories that contain them. The Authorisation 
 
1 In fact, any URI can be used, but a specific URI handler must be registered with the 
PERMIS RBAC at initialisation time. 
2 For example, this is the way some Public Key Certificates are located on some web-servers. 
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Service will then pull the attributes from this referenced repository. Note that 
where the attributes are stored as digitally signed X.509 ACs, they are 
tamperproof and so it is still possible to use such references for making 
secure decisions. To cater for this extension to SAML, a new parameter to 
the PERMIS getCreds method has been introduced. It provides the PERMIS 
Authorisation Service with a list of repositories to contact to get the subject’s 
credentials. 
To configure the PERMIS Authorisation Service at initialisation time, it 
is necessary to specify the URL of the LDAP repository where the policy is 
located, the Distinguished Name of the manager issuing the policy, and the 
Object Identifier of the actual policy to be used. These parameters are 
specified in the GT3 Service Container deployment descriptor. 
Unfortunately, there is currently no way to make the deployment descriptor 
tamperproof. Therefore to ensure that the Grid service is always correctly 
configured, it is recommended that a human security officer should always 
be present at the service start-up time, to check that the configuration 
parameters that the service uses are the expected ones. 
3.3 Operation Scenario 
There are two modes of interaction between GT3 and PERMIS 
Authorisation.  One mode is remote, the other mode is local.  In remote 
mode a PERMIS Authorisation Service is set up to serve a number of Grid 
Service Containers.  In local mode of operation each Grid Service Container 
has its own PERMIS Authorisation set up as an Authorisation Handler.  In 
local mode there are no SAML messages, and authorisation is done via the 
PERMIS API, so only a comparison of this mode to the remote mode of 
operation is given in section 4.  The remote mode of operation is described 
below. 
When a subject makes a request of a Grid Service, the subject is typically 
authenticated by the Grid Service Container using SSL and the user's X.509 
certificate (see [8] for details). The subject may also invoke operations 
anonymously, in which case a special identifier (*) is used to indicate an 
anonymous user. The service container generates a SAML Authorisation 
Request, which includes an identifier of the subject, an identifier of the 
service (its Grid Service Handle, a URI), and the name of the operation 
being invoked. This information is enveloped in a message containing a 
timestamp and signature along with other information to protect the message 
from tampering and prevent replay attacks. This message is sent to the 
trusted Authorisation Service as defined in the service's configuration, e.g. a 
PERMIS Authorisation Service. 




The Authorization Service parses the request, uses the policy to make an 
authorisation decision about the request, and returns a response containing 
the decision (again enveloped in a message which includes a signature and 
replay protection). Only an affirmative decision will cause the service 
container to allow for the action requested by the user to be executed. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The implementation described above should help to provide Role-Based 
Access Controls in Virtual Organisations built on Grids. Each of the 
resource providers will write a PERMIS policy for resource usage, and 
authorise collaborative institutions to issue roles to their members. The 
collaborative institutions will issue role assignment X.509 Attribute 
Certificates to their members, and based on these and the policy, the 
PERMIS ADF will make the authorisation decisions. 
The implementation is now complete and pilot testing is due to take place 
during the next 5 months, so that actual results should be present in time for 
the CMS2004 conference. 
It is still questionable how efficient it is to have such an authorisation 
service called via SAML/SOAP/Http rather than to have a PDP/ADF called 
locally via a programmable API. The gain that can be achieved using the 
centralised PDP is that in single sign-on distributed systems such as the Grid, 
the authorisation tokens (attribute certificates) of the user would have to be 
retrieved only once, rather than at each resource of the distributed system. In 
most cases this might give a doubtful gain in performance because SAML 
messages still have to be generated for each request.  
A centralised PDP should make policy management easier – security 
managers do not have to change the policy at each PDP. However, the 
PERMIS infrastructure has already addressed this problem by storing its 
policy as a digitally signed AC in a central LDAP repository, from where all 
the distributed systems can retrieve the same policy. 
A centralised PDP can provide more user privacy. For example, it is 
easier to conceal the user’s identity in a single trusted PDP (and use a 
pseudonym throughout the rest of the system), rather than spread this 
knowledge across PDPs at each resource site.  
A centralised PDP makes implementation of the Principle of Separation of 
Duties much easier to enforce – it is easier to track what roles a user has 
assumed in the past, so his further requests do not clash (e.g. the Payment 
Requestor cannot be a Payment Guarantee for the same order, and an 
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Accountant cannot be an Auditor for the same transaction). This is much 
more difficult to enforce with multiple distributed PDPs. 
Having said all this, it should be noted that most authorisation decision 
systems today are local, i.e. no centralised decision-making is done. De-
centralising the decision-making process has its benefits, which are usually 
connected with the speed of decision making, and the up-to-date reflection 
of the system’s state in the PDP (as contextual parameters). 
The Grid environment encourages institutions to collaborate with each 
other.  The links between these institutions may be established in a fairly 
spontaneous way, and these institutions may already have their own 
Privilege Management Infrastructures in place.  This means that the 
participating institutions may have already assigned roles to their members.  
It is important in this case that the collaborating institutions are able to 
recognise each other’s role assignments and optimally to be able to compare 
the roles issued by the different participating institutions.  Currently the 
PERMIS policy has to be configured with all the different roles, and 
permissions assigned to each. In the future we expect to be able to express 
role mappings, and one of our ongoing projects aims to facilitate dynamic 
cross-institutional virtual organisations using existing PMIs. 
5. REFERENCES 
[1] OASIS. “Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML)”. 19 April 2002. See http://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/security/ 
[2] Globus toolkit, http://www.globus.org/toolkit 
[3] D.W.Chadwick, A. Otenko, E.Ball. “Implementing Role Based Access Controls Using 
X.509 Attribute Certificates”, IEEE Internet Computing, March-April 2003, pp. 62-69. 
[4] ITU-T Rec X.812 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996 “Security Frameworks for open 
systems: Access control framework” 
[5] Shibboleth Project, available at http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/ 
[6] L. Pearlman, V. Welch, I. Foster, C. Kesselman, S. Tuecke. “A Community 
Authorization Service for Group Collaboration”. Proceedings of the IEEE 3rd 
International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, 2002. 
[7] Johnston, W., Mudumbai, S., Thompson, M. “Authorization and Attribute Certificates for 
Widely Distributed Access Control,” IEEE 7th Int Workshops on Enabling Technologies: 
Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WET ICE), Stanford, CA. June, 1998. 
Page(s): 340 -345 (see also http://www-itg.lbl.gov/security/Akenti/) 
[8] Von Welch, Frank Siebenlist, Ian Foster, John Bresnahan, Karl Czajkowski, Jarek Gawor, 
Carl Kesselman, Sam Meder, Laura Pearlman, and Steven Tuecke. Security for grid 
services. In Twelfth International Symposium on High Performance Distributed 
Computing (HPDC-12). IEEE Computer Society Press, 2003. 
[9] Von Welch, Frank Siebenlist, David Chadwick, Sam Meder, Laura Pearlman. “Use of 
SAML for OGSA Authorization”, Jan 2004, Available from 
https://forge.gridforum.org/projects/ogsa-authz 




[10] ISO 9594-8/ITU-T Rec. X.509 (2001) The  Directory:  Public-key and attribute 
certificate frameworks 
[11] T. Howes, M. Smith. "The LDAP URL Format", RFC 2255, Dec 1997  
[12] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (1997) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998, Information Technology 
- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic Notation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
